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Amended proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
on speeding up and clarify  ina the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
(presented by the Commission pursuant to Article 189 a (2) 
of the EC-Treaty) EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
The amended Commission proposals for Council Regulations on the strenglheni11g (~f the 
surveillance a!ld coordination c?f budgetmy policie,\· and on .\peeding up and  c/ar~fying 
the  implementation  c!f the  excessive  deficit pmcedure  form  part  of the  Stability  and 
Growth  Pact.  They  are  revised  versions  of the  proposals  earlier  adopted  by  the 
Commission on  16 October 1996 in  COM(96)496 final.  They include  the amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament which have been accepted by the Commission and 
the agreements reached in  the European Council in Dublin in  December 1996.  The first 
proposed  Regulation  also  now  includes  the  proposals  of the  Commission  on  non-
participating  Member  States  and  their  convergence  programmes,  in  response  to  the 
invitation from the Dublin European Council. Both texts further incorporate a number of 
drafting changes agreed by the Commission in the light of the ongoing discussions in  the 
Council Working Group on EMU which has been examining the proposals. 
The Commission  is  presenting these proposals now in  advance of the informal  Ecofin 
Council  at  Noordwijk in  April  and  with  a view to final  agreement on the stability and 
growth pact at the Amsterdam European Council in June. Amended proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
....................... 
on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular  the  second 
subparagraph of Article l04c, paragraph 14, thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Monetary Institute, 
(1)  Whereas for economic and monetary union to function smoothly, it is necessary not only that the 
convergence  criteria be  fulfilled,  but  also  that  economic  and fiscal  performances  prove  stable  and 
durable; whereas the maintenance of  sound budgetary positions in the Member States contributes in the 
medium and long term to the creation of the appropriate conditions for the sustained growth of output 
and  employment;  whereas  budgetary discipline will  be  required in the third stage of economic  and 
monetary union to safeguard monetary stability; 
(2) Whereas national budgetary policies need to be set so as to create room for manoeuvre in adapting to 
exceptional and cyclical disturbances and so as to  avoid excessive deficits;  whereas it is necessary  to 
define the concept of an exceptional and temporary excess over the reference value when resulting from 
an unusual event or a severe economic downturn as referred to in Article 104c(2); 
(3)  Whereas the Protocol N°  5 on the excessive deficit procedure  contains provisions relating to the 
implementation of the procedure foreseen in Article 104c; whereas further implementing provisions arc 
necessary; whereas, according to the second subparagraph of Article 104c(l4), the Council shall adopt 
the appropriate provisions to that effect; whereas the provisions of  this Regulation together with those of 
the Protocol constitute a new integrated set of  rules; 
(4) Whereas in accordance with Article 109k(3) of  the Treaty, paragraphs 9 and 11 of Article 104c shall 
not  apply  to  the  Member  States  with  a  derogation;  whereas  in  accordance  with  paragraph  2  of 
Protocol No.  12  on certain provisions relating to Denmark, paragraphs 9 and 11  of ArtiCle  104c shall 
not  apply to  Denmark  as long as it has not withdrawn the notification made in the context of the 
Edinburgh  decision  of 12  December  1992,  that  it will  not  participate  in the  third  stage;  whereas 
paragraph 2 of Protocol No.  11  on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland stipulates that, inter alia, paragraph 5 of  that said Protocol shall have effect if  the 
United  Kingdom  notifies  that  Council  that it does  not intend to  move  to  the  third  stage;  whereas 
paragraph 5 stipulates that,  inter alia, paragraphs  1,  9 and  11  of Article  l04c of the Treaty shall  not 
npply to the United Kingdom; ('i) Whereas there  is  a  need to  establish dclinitions and deadlines for  the application of the excessive 
deficit  procedure in order to ensure its expeditious and effective application; whereas there is a  need to 
specify how the sanctions foreseen in Article 1  04c of the Treaty could, on an annual basis,  be imposed 
on Member States which persistently fail to correct an e:xcessi'ft deficit situation in order to ensure the 
effective application of  the excessive deficit procedure; 
(6)  Whereas the present regulation forms part of the &lability rmd growth pact for ensuring budgetary 
discipline in stage three of EMU; whereas the pact inclmles two main elements (i)  strengthening the 
surveillance  and  coordination  of  budgetary  policies  and  (ii)  speeding  up  and  clarifYing  the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure; whereas the first of these elements provides an early 
warning system in which divergences from Member States medium-term budgetary paths arc idcntilicd 
and  recommendations  made by  the  Council  to  take  corrective  acti{m  well  before  a  dclicit  position 
becomes excessive; 
(7) Whereas the rules for such a strengthening of the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies 
have been laid down in Council Regulation[  .... ]; 
(X)  Whereas the reinforced surveillance in the terms of Regulation [  ... ] together with the Commission's 
monitoring of budgetary positions in accordance with paragraph 2 of article  104c should facilitate the 
effective and rapid implementation of the excessive deficit procedure; 
(9) Whereas, in the light of  the above, an overall maximum period of  ten months from the reporting date 
or any other activation of the procedure until, if necessary,  the imposition of sanctions  seems both 
feasible  and  appropriate  in order to  exert pressure  on the  Member  State  to  implement  corrective 
measures;  in the event of a  procedure starting in March this could lead to  sanctions being imposed 
within the calendar year in which the procedure has been started; 
(I 0) Whereas the Council recommendation for the correction of an excessive deficit or the later steps of 
the excessive deficit procedure should have been anticipated by the Member State concerned. which wi II 
have  had  an  early  warning  and  thus  a  long  period  to  prepare  corrective  measures.  Whereas  the 
seriousness of moving into excessive deficit in stage three should call  for  urgent action from  all  those 
involved; 
(II) Whereas when acting with a view to  correct the excessive deficit the government of the Member 
State concerned will,  if required by  national  law,  take  measures associating the national  parliament: 
whereas the excessive deficit procedure should enable parliaments to play their full  role;  whereas the 
national decision-making process in accordance with article 3 of  the Protocol no 5,  should not, as such. 
hinder the expeditious implementation of  the excessive deficit procedure; 
(12)  Whereas it is  appropriate to  establish deadlines in the  Council recommendation under  Article 
1  04c(7) for the taking of effective action by the Member State concerned and for the correction of the 
excessive deficit; 
(II) Whereas the aim of the excessive dclicil procedure is to provide incentives to  Member States to take 
corn:ctivc action and in that case the procedure should be held in abeyance; whereas the procedure shall 
imntcdiatcly be resumed ir the action is not being implemented or is proving to be inadequate; 
( J.l) Whereas it  is considered that, in order to ensure that the excessive deficit procedure has a snllicicnt 
deterrent clfect. a 11011-interest-bearing deposit of appropriate sil'.e  should be required from the Member 
State concerned when the Council decides to impose a sanction; whereas the excessive dclicit procedure 
is an annual procedure and sanctions could therefore be imposed on an annual basis; (15)  Whereas the  definition of sanctions on a prescribed scale removes  uncertainties  and would thus 
allow those involved in the procedure to have full information about it; whereas it is appropriate to relate 
the amount of the deposit to the GDP of the Member State concerned; whereas it is appropriate that the 
deposit should consist of a fixed component and a variable component proportional to the excess of the 
deficit over the 3% of GDP reference value;  whereas it is  also appropriate to  fix  a maximum annual 
amount, a8 a percent of GDP, to the sanctions for the latter not to have counterproductive effects; 
(16)  Whereas in the  event that the constitution of a non-interest-bearing deposit  does  not induce the 
Member  State  concerned to correct its excessive deficit within two years  of the decision to  impose  a 
deposit, then it is appropriate to intensify the sanctions; whereas it is therefore appropriate to transform 
the deposit into a fine; 
(17)  Whereas  significant progress in correcting the excessive deficit should allow  for  some lifting of 
sanctions in accordance with paragraph  12 of article  104c;  whereas  the abrogation of all  outstanding 
sanctions should only occur once the excessive deficit has been fully corrected; 
(18)  Whereas Council Regulation EC n°  3605/93  on the application of the  Protocol on the  excessive 
deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community1 sets detailed rules for the 
reporting of budgetary data by the Member States; 
(19)  Whereas,  according to  Article 109f(8),  where the Treaty provides for  a consultative role  for  the 
European  Central  Bank  (ECB),  references. to  the  ECB  shall  be  read  as  referring  to  the  European 
Monetary Institute before the establishment of the ECB, 




This Regulation sets out the provisions to speed up and clarify the excessive deficit procedure, having 
the objective to deter excessive general government deficits and, if  they occur, to correct them promptly. 
Article 1 
1.  The  excess of a government deficit over  the  reference value  shall be considered exceptional  and 
temporary, in accordance with Article  104c(2a) 2nd indent,  when resulting from an unusual  event 
outside the. control  of the  relevant Member State and which has  a major impact  on the  financial 
position of the general government, or when resulting from a severe economic downturn. In addition, 
if the unusual event or the severe economic downturn has come to an end or if  it is forecast that it 
will come to an end in the calendar year following the year in which the deficit exceeds the reference 
value,  budgetary forecasts  provided by  the  Commission  must  indicate  that the  deficit  would  fall 
below the reference value in this same following year. 
I  OJ n° L 332, 31.12.93, p.7. 
I 2.  The Commission when preparing a report under Article 104c(3) shall consider, as a rule, an excess 
of the  reference value  resulting from  an economic downturn to be exceptional  only if there  is  an 
<mnual fall of real GDP of  at least 2%. 
3.  The Council when deciding, according to Article 104c(6), whether an excessive deficit exists shall in 
its  overall  assessment take  into  account  any observations  made  by  the  Member  State  concerned 
showing that an annual fall  of real GDP  of less than 2% is  nevertheless exceptional  in light of 
further supporting evidence, in particular on the abruptness of the downturn or on the accumulated 
loss of output relative to past trends. 
SECTION 2 
Speeding up the excessive deficit procedure 
Article 3 
1.  Within two weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 
1  04c(3 ),  the  Economic and  Financial  Committee  shall formulate  an  opinion  in  accordance  with 
Article 104c(4). 
2.  The Commission, taking fully into account the opinion referred to in paragraph 1 and if  it considers 
that an excessive deficit exists, shall address an opinion and a recommendation to the Council for a 
decision. 
3.  The Council shall decide on the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article I  04c(6), 
within three months of the reporting dates established in Articles 4.2 and 4.3  of Council Regulation 
EC/3605193.  Where  it  decides  on  the  existence  of an  excessive  deficit  in  accordance  with 
Article 104c(6)  the  Council  at  the  same  time  shall  issue  recommendations  to  the  Member  State 
concerned in accordance with Article l04c(7). 
4.  The Council recommendation issued in accordance with Article 104c(7) shall establish a deadline for 
effective action  to be taken by the Member State concerned and a deadline for the correction of the 
excessive deficit, which should be completed in the year following the identification of an excessive 
deficit unless special circumstances are given. 
Article 4 
I.  Any Council decision to make its recommendations public having established that no effective action 
has been taken in accordance with Article 104c(8) shall be taken within four months of the decision 
on  the  existence  of an excessive  deficit  in accordance  with  Article  104c(6)  and  the  issuing  of 
recommendations in accordance with Article 104c(7). 
2.  The  Council,  when  considering  whether  effective  action  has  been  taken  in  response  to  its 
recommendations issued  in  accordance with  Article  I04c(7),  shall  base its  assessment  on  publici~· 
announced decisions by the Government of the Member State concerned.  If these publicly announced 
decisions  arc  not  legally  enforced.  or if the  budgetary  impact  of these  decisions  is  substantially 
weakened during the adoption process. then the Council shall resume the excessive delicit procedure 
immediately. Article 5 
Any Council decision to give notice to the Member State to take measures for the deficit reduction in 
accordance  with  Article  104c(9)  shall be taken  within one  month of the  Council  decision  that  no 
effective action has been taken in accordance with Article 104c(8). 
Article 6 
If  a Member State fails to act in compliance with the successive decisions of the Council under Articles 
104c(7) and Article 104c(9), the Council shall, in accordance with Article 104c(ll), decide to impose 
sanctions. Subject to the provisions in Article 9 of this regulation, any such decision shall be taken no 
later than two months after the Council decision to give notice to the Member State to take measures in 
accordance with Article 104c(9). 
Article 7 
Subject to the provisions in Article 9 of  this regulation, the decision of the Council to impose sanctions. 
shall be taken within ten months of the reporting date of the figures  confirming the existence of an 
excessive deficit.  An expedited  procedure shall be used in the  case  of a deliberately planned deficit 
which the Council decides is excessive. 
Article 8 
Any Council decision to intensifY sanctions (other than the imposition of  fines dealt with in Article 13 of 
this  Regulation)  in accordance with Article  104c(ll), or to  abrogate  some  or all  of its  decisions  in 
accordance with Article  104c(l2), shall be taken no later than  two  months after the reporting dates 
pursuant to Council Regulation EC/3605/93. 
SECTION3 
Abeyance and lllOilitoring 
Article 9 
The excessive deficit procedure shall be held in abeyance if  a Member State takes effective action  in 
response to a recommendation under Article 104c(7) or a notice issued under Article l04c(9). 
Article /0 
I.  The  Commission  and  lhe  Council  shall  monilor  the  implementation  of action  laken  by  Member 
Slates in response to recommendations issued under Article 104c(7) and notices issued under Article 
104c(9).  If action  is  not  being  implemented,  or  in  the  Council's  view  is  ineffective  thereby 
weakening its  budgetary  impact,  the Council  shall,  as  a  rule,  proceed  immediately to  a decision 
under Article  I04c(9) or Article 104c(ll) respectively. 
2.  If actual data indicate that an excessive deficit has not been corrected within the time-limits specified 
either in recommendations issued under Article 104c(7) or notices issued under Article 104c(9), the 




Whenever  the  Council  decides  to  apply  sanctions  to  a  Member  State  in accordance  with  Article 
104c(ll), a  non-interest-bearing  deposit  shall,  as  a  rule,  be  required.  The  Council  may  decide  to 
supplement this deposit by the measures foreseen in the first and second indents of  Article 104c(ll). 
Article 12 
The amount of the deposit shall comprise a fixed component equal to 0.2% of GDP,  and a variable 
component equal to one tenth of the difference between the deficit as  a percentage of GDP  and the 
reference value in the year preceding the decision to impose sanctions. An upper limit of  0.5% of GDP is 
set for the annual amount of deposits. 
Article 13 
If  the excessive deficit in the view of the Council has not been corrected, a deposit, as a rule, shall be 
converted to  a  fine  two  years  after the decision to  impose  that deposit  in accordance  with  Article 
104c(ll), without prejudice to Article 9 of  this Regulation. 
Article 14 
In  accordance with Article  l04c(l2), the  Council  may  decide to  abrogate  some  or all  the  sanctions 
defined in the first and second indents of Article 104c(ll) to the extent that the Member State is making 
significant, though not yet sufficient progress in correcting the excessive deficit. 
Article 15 
In accordance with Article 104c(12), the Council shall abrogate all outstanding sanctions if  the decision 
on the existence of  an excessive deficit is abrogated. Fines imposed in accordance with Article 13 of  this 
Regulation shall not be returned to the Member State concerned. 
Article 16 
Deposits as specified in Article 12 of this Regulation shall be lodged with the Commission. Interest on 
the deposits and fines specified in Article 13 of  this Regulation constitute resources of  the general budget 
of the European Communities. 
Article 17 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1999. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety  and directly applicable in all Member States. ISSN 0254-14  7  5 
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